
A high-quality red team engagement costs $100,000 to $300,000 or more. It requires specialized expertise, takes weeks to months, and produces findings that—if you’re being honest—often overlap with issues you already suspected.
For Fortune 500 companies facing nation-state threats, this investment makes sense. For everyone else, the calculus is harder.
This isn’t an argument that red teaming is worthless. It’s a guide for organizations that can’t justify the cost but still want to understand how an attacker would approach their environment. You have options.
Before discussing alternatives, let’s clarify what a red team engagement involves:
Reconnaissance: Mapping the organization’s attack surface, gathering intelligence from public sources, identifying potential entry points.
Initial access: Actually breaching the perimeter—phishing employees, exploiting external vulnerabilities, or finding other ways in.
Persistence and lateral movement: Establishing footholds, moving through the network, escalating privileges, avoiding detection.
Objective achievement: Reaching predefined goals—accessing specific data, compromising critical systems, demonstrating business impact.
Detection evasion: Doing all of this while avoiding or testing detection capabilities.
The value isn’t just the list of vulnerabilities. It’s understanding how an attacker chains issues together, tests your defenses in realistic conditions, and exposes gaps between your security assumptions and reality.
Purple teaming is collaborative rather than adversarial. Your security team (blue) works with an offensive tester (red) in real-time to test detection and response capabilities.
How it works:
Why it’s valuable:
Estimated cost: $15,000-50,000 for a multi-day purple team exercise.
When to use it: When you have detection capabilities to test but aren’t sure if they work. When your team would benefit from seeing real attack techniques. When you want rapid improvement rather than a one-time assessment.
Traditional penetration testing is less comprehensive than red teaming but still valuable. The difference: pentests are typically scoped to specific systems, with defenders aware testing is occurring, and without the stealth and objective-driven nature of red teams.
How to maximize pentest value on a budget:
Prioritize by risk. Don’t test everything—test your crown jewels. External perimeter, critical applications, systems that would be catastrophic if compromised. A $20,000 pentest of your most critical assets beats a $100,000 comprehensive assessment of everything.
Ask for attack path analysis. Good pentesters don’t just list vulnerabilities—they chain them. Request explicit documentation of how initial access leads to lateral movement leads to objective compromise.
Focus on your differentiated risk. Generic web app pentests find generic web app vulnerabilities. If your risk is specific—unusual architecture, custom protocols, industry-specific threats—brief the pentest team on those specifics.
Estimated cost: $10,000-50,000 for a scoped penetration test.
When to use it: When you need to validate specific systems against real attacks. When compliance requires penetration testing. When you want an external perspective on your most critical assets.
BAS tools automate attack simulation, continuously testing your controls against known techniques.
How they work:
Why they’re valuable:
Limitations:
Estimated cost: $30,000-100,000+ annually for enterprise BAS platforms.
When to use it: When you have detection infrastructure to continuously validate. When you want to measure improvement over time. When you have the maturity to act on findings.
Skip the initial access question entirely. Give a tester internal access as if they’d already compromised an employee workstation, and focus assessment on:
Why this works:
Estimated cost: $20,000-50,000 depending on scope and duration.
When to use it: When you’re confident in perimeter security but worried about lateral movement. When you want to test internal segmentation and detection. When you’ve already done external pentests and want to go deeper.
For organizations with some internal security expertise, you can conduct basic adversary simulation yourself.
Resources available:
How to approach it:
Why this works:
Limitations:
Estimated cost: Internal time only.
When to use it: When you have security team members with offensive skills. When you want ongoing testing between formal assessments. When budget is extremely constrained.
Not all security testing requires actual exploitation. Tabletop exercises walk through attack scenarios hypothetically, revealing gaps in people and process without touching technology.
How they work:
Why they’re valuable:
Limitations:
Estimated cost: Can be done internally for free; professional facilitation $5,000-15,000.
When to use it: When you want to test incident response readiness. When you’re training new team members. When budget allows nothing else.
These alternatives don’t fully replace red teaming. Some situations genuinely require the full engagement:
Advanced threat actors in your threat model. If nation-states or sophisticated criminal groups target your industry, testing against basic attack techniques isn’t sufficient. You need testers who replicate advanced adversary behavior.
High-value targets with complex defenses. If you’ve invested heavily in security and want to validate that investment, a red team that finds creative paths around your controls is valuable.
Board or regulatory expectation. Some boards and regulators expect red team assessments for critical organizations. Explaining that you did purple team instead may not fly.
Security program maturity validation. If you’ve built a security program over years and want a comprehensive evaluation, red team provides that.
Merger, acquisition, or major transformation. Major changes create opportunities for attackers. A red team assessment of the combined/new environment validates security posture.
For most organizations, the right approach combines multiple alternatives:
Annual cycle:
Biennial red team:
Continuous DIY testing:
This approach costs a fraction of annual red team engagements while providing broader coverage and faster improvement cycles.
Alternatives to red teaming aren’t as comprehensive. They won’t find everything a skilled red team would find. They won’t replicate the full adversary experience.
But “perfect security testing” isn’t the goal—”good enough security testing given constraints” is. Most organizations get more value from regular purple teams and targeted pentests than from occasional expensive red teams that produce reports nobody acts on.
Match your testing to your maturity. As you improve, your testing should evolve. The goal is continuous improvement, not checking a box.