Just last month, a small company quickly lost $7,000 to payment fraud. What's noteworthy isn't that it happened—Business Email Compromise is a billion-dollar drain on our economy—but how it occurred. The attack didn't involve sophisticated technical exploitation. Instead, the fraudster emailed the company's accountant, impersonating a vendor, and requested a payment for license renewals.
It's late Friday afternoon. You receive a call from someone identifying themselves as a member of the finance department. They explain that a critical vendor payment needs updating immediately. Shortly after, you receive a legitimate-looking email with "updated" account details. Under pressure to complete end-of-week tasks, you process the change.
This simple sequence represents how most payment fraud succeeds—by targeting human decision-making rather than technical systems.
When perpetrating payment fraud, whether through wire transfers or ACH payments, fraudsters employ calculated psychological tactics.
"Hi, this is John from Vendor X. We've updated our banking details for ACH payments. I'll send you an email with the new information. Could you update it in your system for our next payment?"
Phone rings "This is Melissa from the CEO's office. She's in an emergency board meeting but needs you to process this ACH payment right away. She said you'd understand the urgency. I'll email you the details now."
Phone rings "This is Jason from Vendor A. Your license is expiring soon and I’ll help you process the ACH payment to prevent interruption. I'll email you the details now."
Email arrives that looks exactly like your regular vendor communications "Please note: Our banking details have changed. Please update your records for all future payments. See attached invoice with new payment instructions."
The most effective defense against payment fraud is not necessarily more sophisticated technology, but strategic human interaction:
Verify changes through multiple channels for any payment change request. When someone emails about changes to their banking details, do not respond to that email. Instead, call the requester using contact information from your established records, never using contact details provided in the potentially fraudulent communication.
Establish mandatory dual control for payment information changes. No single employee should have the authority to modify payment routing information without secondary verification.
Utilize video conferencing for verification of significant changes. Visual confirmation significantly reduces the effectiveness of impersonation attempts.
When someone asks you to change payment information or process an unusual payment, follow these straightforward steps.
Any legitimate vendor or colleague will understand why you need to verify payment changes. Anyone who pushes back against verification should be treated with caution.
Never Share (over the phone or email)
Trust, But Verify
If you suspect fraudulent payment activity has occurred
Payment fraud protection extends beyond finance departments. Fraudsters commonly:
Every employee plays a critical role in maintaining payment security integrity.
Payment fraud—whether perpetrated through wire transfers or ACH systems—should be understood as a challenge in human psychology rather than a technological vulnerability. This understanding necessitates human-centered countermeasures.
Investing a few minutes in verification procedures can prevent significant financial losses and the operational disruption that often follows successful fraud attempts.